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Information security policies can be considered as guidelines and used as a starting point to create a 
security structure within an organization. Although practitioners continuously emphasize the 
importance of such policies, information system scholars have not paid the required attention to this 
context from the cross-cultural perspective. The purpose of this study is to look at the cultural and 
institutional differences of a multinational company (MNC) and its subsidiaries, and discuss how these 
differences affect the MNC’s strategy to enforce corporate information security policies to its 
subsidiaries in different cultural settings. The proposed framework considers the effects of the cultural 
distance, national economy, institutional distance, and stickiness of the knowledge transfer on the 
process of enforcing information security policies from the parent company to its subsidiaries. 
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Today, ensuring availability, integrity and confidentiality of information and data concerns many 
organizations. Deterrence can be one of the initial steps that organizations can take to ensure 
information security (Straub and Welke, 1998). However, successful deterrence depends on 
organization’s ability to control its environment with respect to internal and external threats. 
Information security policies define the nature of these controls (i.e., technical, formal and informal 
controls) and how these controls complement each other (Dhillon, 1999). 
Moreover, security policies govern how organizations’ information should be protected (Kabay, 2002; 
Barman, 2002). Whitman (2004) posits that a good security policy needs to “outline individual 
responsibilities, define authorized and unauthorized uses of the systems, provide venues for employee 
reporting of identified or suspects threats to the system, define penalties for violations, and provide a 
mechanism for updating policy” (p.52). Enforcing corporate security policies has been reported as one 
of the most effective ways to prevent or reduce electronic crime (Gordon et al., 2004). Overall, 
security policies can be considered as guidelines and can be used as a starting point for creating a 
security structure within an organization (Whitman, 2004).  
The nature of multinational companies (MNCs) adds a layer of complexity to enforcing security 
policies because MNCs need to consider the effects of different cultural and organizational settings 
and integrate these in their corporate security policies. Basing his arguments on Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, Abdul-Gader (1997) emphasized culture as one of the most important environmental 
factors that MNCs should consider while adopting global Information Systems (IS) policies in Arab 
Gulf countries. He postulated that misconceptions of understanding about fate in the Islamic context 
and the technical capability of the Arab language are some of the issues that need to be considered by 
MNCs. However, management practices do not have to be different just because subsidiaries and 
parent company are in different countries and cultural settings. In their study, for instance, Anakwe et 
al. (2000) concluded that organizational support enhances microcomputer usage in Nigeria. Their 
result found support in other studies which demonstrated that similar management practices can be 
effective in different cultural settings (Igbaria, et al. 1995; Igbaria, 1992). 
Although practitioners continuously emphasize the importance of security policies, IS scholars have 
not paid the required attention to this context from the cross-cultural perspective. For instance, in their 
citation analysis of IS articles, Ford et al. (2003) found 57 articles about various contexts of IS that 
cited Hofstede’s research on national culture. Further analyses showed that IS Management area led 
with 25 articles. Within this research stream, however, no study cited Hofstede’s work in the IS Risk 
Management context.  
We aim to fulfil this gap by looking at cultural and institutional differences of an MNC and its 
subsidiaries and by investigating how these differences affect the MNC’s strategy to enforce corporate 
security policies to its subsidiaries in different cultural settings. More specifically, we will discuss 
cultural distance, institutional distance, and the stickiness of the knowledge transfer and offer series of 
propositions. Our goal is to make a unique contribution to the IS security literature by focusing on the 
issues to be considered while enforcing information security policies within the MNC framework. 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
According to Minbaeva et al. (2003), MNCs can develop knowledge in one location and exploit it in 
another location through internal transfer of knowledge. One way of creating competitive advantage 
for MNCs is effectively sharing organizational practices (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). For example, in 
the strategy literature, organizational practices and routines are considered as important sources of 
 
 
competitive advantage since these assets are difficult to replicate (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). 
Considering that organizational know-how is an important part of a MNC’s global integration strategy, 
its competitive advantage partly resides in the effectiveness of sharing these practices and routines. 
MNCs are generally under different external and internal pressures. Externally, MNCs have to 
consider the institutional, cultural, and economic environments in multiple countries and have to be 
isomorphic with the local institutional environment to maintain their legitimacy (Kostova and Roth, 
2002). Establishing and maintaining legitimacy in their multiple host environments is critical for 
companies that span various countries (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Internally, MNCs have to create 
consistency among their subsidiaries by leveraging activities worldwide to retain their competitive 
advantages (Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
We postulate that the process of enforcing information security policies to subsidiary companies 
would be affected by the cultural and institutional distances between the parent company and the 
subsidiary company. Moreover, the stickiness of the information security context would further affect 
this process. Figure 1 presents the framework of our study. 
 
 
Figure 1: The proposed framework for enforcing information security policies in multinational 
companies  
The main goal of information security policies is to provide a set of rules and guidelines to protect the 
organization from security breaches. Under the umbrella of this goal, organizations can have variety of 
security policies addressing different issues such as identification and authorization, Internet access, 
contingency planning, and even social networking. Although MNCs can span across continents, the 
interconnectedness of IT emphasizes the importance of enforcing information security policies on 
subsidiaries by the parent companies. Such that, a security breach or comprise of access rights at the 
subsidiary company can easily target the parent company through privilege escalation or social 
engineering.  
While transferring the actual information security policies consists of a simple process of sending the 
policies to the subsidiary companies, it is the implications of adhering with the requirements of such 
policies that create the difficulties in enforcing them. Security policies have unique features that 
separate them from other management practices. For instance, where a human resources practice 
focuses on recruiting, compensation, and performance appraisal, security policies can outline 
configuration of intrusion detection systems, management of cryptography keys, and designing secure 
infrastructure. Thus, in addition to traditional difficulties as a result of differences in norms, ethics and 
values, the technical requirements embedded in information security policies create the unique 














Enforcing Information Security Policies 
 
 
2.1 National Culture and Cultural Distance 
Various cross-cultural studies reported that there is a certain level of cultural coherence within the 
majority of nations (Hofstede and Peterson, 2000). The concepts that describe a nation’s culture can be 
derived from Hofstede’s (1980) study across 40 nations. The proposed four culture dimensions from 
his study are power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, and 
uncertainty avoidance. The cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 1988) is derived as a composite index 
from Hofstede’s culture dimensions and widely used in international business and various other 
business disciplines (Shenkar, 2001). Literature suggests that the cultural distance can affect various 
organizational level decisions including choice of entry mode of the MNC (Kogut and Singh, 1988), 
performance of alliances (Sirmon and Lane, 2004), distributed justice values (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 
2003), and human resources management practices (Liu, 2004). These studies conclude that cultural 
dimensions and cultural distance index have a central role in MNCs’ global strategy.  
The cultural dimensions have substantial importance in the success of enforcing security policies from 
the parent company to its subsidiaries as well. From the power distance perspective, it is important to 
look at the effects of restrictions outlined in security policies. Access controls, for example, can be 
considered as an effective measurement that is enforced by certain security policies. These controls 
restrict users from series of actions such as downloading files from the Internet, installing programs, 
and accessing certain parts of a computer network (Barman, 2002; Wakefield, 2004; Kabay, 2002). 
With respect to enforcing security policies, these restrictions may be problematic in high power 
distance cultures because adoption of power reducing technologies would be limited in such cultures 
(Straub et al., 1997). 
Hofstede (1980, 1997, 2001) posits that masculine societies put more stress on careers. This may lead 
masculine societies being performance oriented. Therefore, any technological or policy-based change 
in organizations that may hinder performance would create conflicts in masculine societies. 
Technologies outlined in security policies such as firewalls, antivirus programs, and passwords are 
generally considered as having negative effects on performance (Bace, 2002; Barman, 2004; Brussin, 
2002; Cobb, 2002; Sandhu, 2002). Therefore, enforcing security policies to masculine societies may 
compromise certain drawbacks.  
Moreover, security policies reduce ambiguity by outlining certain rules and procedures. The salience 
of these policies depends on the society’s level of uncertainty. Weak uncertainty avoidance societies 
are in favor of less formalization and standardization, whereas in strong uncertainty avoidance 
societies, there is an emotional need for rules (Hofstede, 1997). Therefore, this cultural dimension also 
has an impact on enforcing security policies to subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, security policies may require actions such as monitoring e-mail messages, recording 
keystrokes and collecting private data (Levine, 2002). Similarly, these policies may outline procedures 
for disciplining computer abusers in organizations (Barman, 2002). The tolerance level for these issues 
may differ across societies with respect to the individualism/collectivism dimension. Considering that 
cultural distance index captures the effects of all four cultural dimensions, MNCs that have big 
differences in this index compared to their subisidiaries would require different approaches in 
enforcing security policies. This leads to our first proposition; 
 
P1a: High cultural distance between the parent company and its subsidiaries will have a negative 
effect on the process of enforcing information security policies to the subsidiary companies. 
 
According to Hofstede and Peterson (2000) and Hofstede (2001) the cultural dimensions are useful 
and essential, however, they provide only limited detail. Gross national product, given as an example, 
often matters more than national culture in the national difference context. Parallel to this line of 
 
 
thought, digital divide may be considered as an important factor in enforcing security policies to 
subsidiaries. Some of the limited examples on digital divide point out the potential effects of 
differences in national economies. For example, Dewan et al. (2004) demonstrated the importance of 
digital divide on cross-cultural IT penetration. Checchi et al. (2003) posited that governments play a 
central role in the implementation of IT policies. However, in less developed countries, the role of 
governments becomes more salient, as regional agencies, such as industrial/professional associates and 
international agencies step up into the policy making stage. In another study, Ehikamenor (2002) 
posited that some of the important factors that inhibit the application of information and 
communication technologies in Nigeria are inflation, low GDP, and exchange rates. 
Moreover, enforcing security policies in less developed countries would be problematic in terms of 
meeting the requirements of such policies. One problem is the availability of skilled IT staff. 
Organizations in less developed countries may not have enough human resources or capital to train 
their IT staff to meet the requirements. Another problem is the availability of necessary technology.  
For instance, required hardware and software products may not be available in less developed 
countries. These issues concerning countries’ economic viability lead us to our next proposition;  
 
P1b: Differences in the national economy of the parent company and its subsidiaries will have a 
negative effect on the process of enforcing information security policies to the subsidiary 
companies.  
 
2.2 Institutional Theory and Institutional Distance 
The institutional theory (Scott, 1995) considers the institutional environment as the key determinant of 
the firm structure and its behavior. In their review of the institutional theory, Xu and Shenkar (2002) 
discussed that the theory has been supported in unitary and domestic environments and received less 
support in more complex environments where different institutional demands exist and where strategic 
choices are important. One of the research streams in this literature involves the interorganizational 
issues. This stream of research is critical from MNCs’ perspective since these companies feel pressure 
from two different sides: global integration and local orientation (Westney, 1983). This dual pressure 
is also discussed by Rosenzweig and Singh (1991) as the subsidiaries of a multinational enterprise try 
to keep the isomorphism with their local environments and at the same time keep the internal 
consistency within the enterprise. Gomez and Werner (2004) also considered the effects of double 
sided pressure on MNCs and investigated how similarities in management styles of parent and 
subsidiary companies have an effect on the performance of the subsidiaries. This study has the 
advantage of having all the subsidiaries in one country, and therefore, substituting the potential 
confounding effect of national culture. Their results were consistent with the literature and emphasized 
the point that management styles should be congruent with the national culture in which the subsidiary 
resides.  
Scott (1995) defined three pillars of the institutional theory as regulative pillar - the rules and laws to 
ensure stability of societies, normative pillar -  the similarities between the value creation of 
organizations and the societal values, and cognitive pillar - the degree of consistency between  
organizations and existing structures of the society (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Busenitz et al., 2000). 
Following this framework, Kostova (1996, 1999) developed the institutional distance construct.  The 
institutional distance can be considered as an alternative explanation of MNC behavior to the cultural 
distance. The institutional distance is the extent of dissimilarities between host and home 
organizations. In other words, it is the difference among the regulatory, normative and cognitive 
institutions of two countries (Kostova, 1996). According to the findings of Kostova and Zaheer 
(1999), the larger the institutional distance, the more difficult it is for the MNC to establish and 
maintain its legitimacy in the host country. Another effect of institutional distance is on the recipient’s 
 
 
(subsidiary) motivation. On their study, Jensen and Szulanski (2004) found significant negative 
relationship between the institutional distance and the recipient’s motivation. 
Kostova and Roth (2002) further refined Scott’s (1995) three pillars to introduce the concept of 
institutional profile. They posited that the institutional profile of a host country may affect the 
adoption of practices at a foreign subsidiary through “the direct institutional pressure on the subsidiary 
to adopt the practice” (p. 217). Adoption of practices may also be accomplished through subsidiary’s 
employees since institutional theorists advocate that people in organizations are sources of the 
institutional elements.  As discussed, subsidiaries experience institutional duality because they feel 
pressure to reside in parent company’s institutional environment and also to create isomorphism with 
their own environment.  Kostova and Roth (2002) discuss that this relational context between the 
parent and subsidiary company also influences the adoption of practices. 
These institutional factors are considered in the IS literature as well. For instance, Munir (2002) 
discussed the normative and cognitive factors within the technology transfer context. He defined three 
aspects of technology transfer: choosing the right technology, developing managerial and technical 
expertise, and accommodating technology into the organization. From the security policies and MNC 
perspective, the last aspect carries more weight. In most cases, security policies are supported with 
technological infrastructure such as use of firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc. The normative 
influences will require managerial control when more knowledge-intensive technology is being 
imported to environments characterized by less knowledge-intensive technology since complex 
technologies tend to conflict with existing management practices (Munir, 2002; Hansen et al., 1999). 
Overall, security policies have to fit to the existing institutional character of the organizations in order 
to be successfully enforced. Since security policies outline several practices such as disciplining 
computer abusers, participation to formal training and awareness programs, regular third party audits 
and several new hardware and software implementations (Barman, 2002; Siponnen, 2000; Thomson 
and von Solms, 1998), a misfit between subsidiaries’ regulatory environment and requirements of the 
parent company’s security policies will be problematic. Similar to these arguments, Hu et al. (2007) 
reported the effect of all three institutional forces on the initiatives to implement information systems 
security practices and protocols in a MNC. This leads to our next proposition; 
 
P2: High institutional distance between the parent company and its subsidiaries will have a negative 
effect on the process of enforcing information security policies to the subsidiary companies.  
 
2.3 Stickiness and Knowledge Transfer Process 
During the knowledge transfer, parent companies recreate the complex and ambiguous routines in new 
settings. Szulanski (1996) argues that stickiness of organizational practices increases the difficulties of 
the transfer process. Prior research suggests four issues as important factors that contribute to the 
difficulty of knowledge transfer; characteristics of the knowledge transferred, characteristics of the 
source, characteristics of the recipient, and characteristics of the context (Szulanski, 1996).  After 
studying 122 knowledge transfers with respect to these four characteristics, Szulanski (1996) 
concluded that the origins of stickiness are the lack of absorptive capacity of the recipient, causal 
ambiguity, and the arduous relationship between the source and the recipient.  
In their study, Ko et al. (2005) investigated the antecedents of knowledge transfer from consultants to 
clients in enterprise system implementations. The data were gathered from 96 enterprise resource 
planning projects including 80 client organizations and 38 consulting firms. The antecedents were 
grouped into three factors: communication, knowledge and motivational. Their results were also 
parallel to Szulanski’s findings.  Additional to knowledge factors such as arduous relationship, 
absorptive capacity and shared understanding, Ko et al. (2005) found that direct effects of both 
 
 
source’s and recipient’s intrinsic motivations, source credibility and indirect effects of communication 
encoding and decoding competence are also important determinants of the knowledge transfer.   
Current understanding of transfer process suggests four stages: initiation, implementation, ramp-up 
and integration.  Szulanski (2000) posits that organizations experience different types of stickiness in 
each stage.  His findings show that motivation and perceived reliability are important factors during 
the first three stages, and absorptive capacity and causal ambiguity are important predictors of 
stickiness when all the stages are put together and the knowledge transfer is considered as a whole. 
In the context of information security, the effect of stickiness will be most visible on the technological 
requirements of security policies. Configurations of hardware and software programs for large scale 
networks require advanced knowledge and experience. This type of knowledge is considered tacit and 
therefore hard to document, replicate or transfer. Moreover, slightly different configurations of 
computers may prevent adaptation of the same solution in different computer networks. Considering 
this “local” solution issue and the tacitness of information security context, transferring security 
policies from one organization to another would be considered as sticky. This leads to our last 
proposition.  
 
P3: The stickiness of the information security practices will have a negative effect on the process of 
enforcing information security policies to the subsidiary companies. 
 
3 Discussion 
While information security and globalization can be considered as two sides of the same coin, the lack 
of cross-cultural studies in the information security literature is worrisome. Our goal is to provide a 
framework as a starting point to fulfil this important gap. This study focuses on the cultural and 
institutional differences of MNCs and their subsidiaries and outlines how these differences affect the 
MNCs’ strategy to enforce information security policies to their subsidiaries in different cultural 
settings.  
Regarding the cultural differences, we proposed that high cultural distance will have a negative effect 
on the process of enforcing security policies to the subsidiaries. Parallel to this, we also proposed that 
differences in national economy and high institutional distance will have negative effects on this 
process as well. Lastly, we proposed that the stickiness of the IS security context will have an 
inherited detrimental effect on the efforts of enforcing these policies. The practical implications of the 
study are also vital. For instance, neglecting the cultural and institutional differences may result in loss 
of resources, high employee turnover, and even increased security breaches. Moreover, if it is not 
executed properly, the transfer of such policies may increase the dual pressure on the subsidiary, 
which in return may hinder their performance. Table 1 outlines these factors and how they relate to 
MNCs’ efforts in enforcing information security policies to their subsidiaries. 
One limitation of the study is the fact that the business context of the MNC may affect the salience of 
the information security policies. Companies in certain industries may need more security than others 
to protect their company specific information such as patents, source codes, manufacturing processes, 
etc. On the other hand, this study opens many directions for future research. One direction can be the 
investigation of the subsidiary absorptive capacity. As discussed above, Szulanski (1996) posits that 
the lack of absorptive capacity is one of the most important impediments to knowledge transfer. 
Minbaeva et al. (2003) also found significant relation between the absorptive capacity of the 
subsidiary and the knowledge transfer within the MNC. Future studies can consider either controlling 




 Sample requirements from 
information security policies 
Potential issues 
Cultural factors   
Power distance Access control to certain files 
In high power distance cultures, it is 
harder for IT employees to limit 
managers’ rights. 
Uncertainty avoidance Regular security audits 
Subsidiaries that are in low uncertainty 
cultures can have harder time to comply 
with rigid requirements of the parent 
company. 
Masculinity/Femininity Use of anti-virus software 
Adoption of performance hindering 
software can be problematic in high 
masculinity cultures due to their focus on 
career advancement. 
Individualism/Collectivism Use of computer monitoring 
Monitoring employee behavior can result 
in negative effect on employee morale, 
satisfaction, and performance in 
subsidiaries that reside in individualistic 
cultures.  
National economy   
 
Implementation of advanced hardware 
or software 
Availability of hardware and localization 
of software can be limited for subsidiaries 
that reside in developing or undeveloped 
countries.  
Institutional  factors   
Regulative 
Certain level of encryption required for 
storing confidential information 
Countries of the subsidiaries can lack the 
regulations that exist in the parent 
company’s country. 
Normative Security certification 
Lack of availability of certain 
certifications or institutions in 
subsidiaries’ countries can limit 
subsidiaries to conform with normative 
factors. 
Cognitive Skilled employee 
Lack of education in computer science and 
related fields in the subsidiaries’ country 
can limit the efforts to comply with the 
requirements of the security policy. 
Stickiness   
 Security of wireless infrastructure 
Designing a secure and reliable wireless 
network requires unique considerations 
such as interference from the environment, 
size and shape of the buildings, etc. Due to 
these localized differences, achieving 
success using the same solution can be 
limited. 
 Table 1. Factors that affect MNCs’ efforts in enforcing information security policies to their 
subsidiary companies. 
 
Another opportunity to take this study one step further is to investigate the effect of the MNC’s 
structure. Barlett and Ghosahal’s (1999) work introduced four different models of MNC: 
multinational, international, global and transnational. Each model has different configuration of assets 
and capabilities, role of foreign subunits, and development and diffusion of knowledge (Kostova and 
Roth, 2003). Therefore, the effectiveness of enforcing information security policies can be contingent 
 
 
on the different characteristics of these four configuration models. In order to test the propositions and 
conduct the suggested future studies, a case study can be conducted to a multinational company with 
subsidiaries in different cultural, economical, and institutional settings. 
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